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ABSTRACT: Radical movements of the Polish far-right consist, as elsewhere, mainly of 
young men. The strict gender binarism, the exaltation of men’s power, homosociality, 
brotherhood, physical strength and subordination of women are omnipresent among 
‘angry white men’ everywhere, Poland included. However, these general characteris-
tics have always its local variants, trajectories, and particularities. This article is an 
attempt to explain the phenomenon of Polish radical right movements in its local 
context: cultural, social, economic. The article focuses on ‘The March of Independ-
ence’ – a cyclical celebration for radical groups, which proliferates the discourses of 
far-right radical masculinity. In the first part, the author focuses on the social and 
economic background, worldview and ‘masculinist’ ideology of Polish’ angry white 
men’ (Kimmel 2013). The second part focuses on the historical and cultural coding of 
their ‘aggrieved entitlement’ (Kimmel 2013). The third part of the essay draws on Ste-
ve’s Garlick (Garlick 2016: 163−193) concept of ‘spectacular masculinity’. It analyzes 
how modern technology contributes to the construction of ‘spectacular’ masculinity 
among the participants of the march/members of radical groups. 
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teristics has always its local variants, trajectories, and particularities. This article is 
an attempt to explain the phenomenon of Polish radical right movements in their 
local contexts: cultural, social, economic. The article focuses on ‘The March of Inde-
pendence’ – radical groups’ cyclical celebration, which proliferates far-right radical 
discourses, and the type of masculinity considered as ‘traditional’. In the first part, the 
author focuses on the social and economic background, worldview and ‘masculinist’ 
ideology of Polish’ angry white men.’
In contrast, the second part focuses on the historical and cultural coding of their 
‘aggrieved entitlement’. The crucial third part of the essay draws on Steve’s Garlick 
concept of ‘spectacular masculinity’. It analyzes how modern technology and social 
media contribute to constructing ‘spectacular masculinity’ among the participants of 
the march/members of radical groups. 
*****
In a recent survey (Center for Public Opinion Research 2016)  the researchers dis-
covered that the acceptance of radical nationalist organizations, as Radical National 
Camp (ONR) is considerably higher among young men than elsewhere in the society – 
almost 38 percent of young Poles approved their political agenda. Three-thirds agreed 
with the statement that the Polish nation had suffered more than any other nation, 
almost 68 per cent believed that they could be proud of national history and accepted 
claim that the Poles acted more nobly and worthily than the others. Polish history as 
a source of pride is considered to be very ‘masculine’ – Maria Janion, one of the most 
respected historians and cultural scholar, once noted that popular heroic vision of 
national history practically excludes women:
Polish national culture is outstandingly masculine. The pivotal role is reserved to 
the homosocial unions of brotherhood and friendship. These unions are empha-
sized throughout our history – from ‘noblemen−brothers’ of the XVII century, 
through romantic formations of male students (Filomatos), patriotic conspira-
tors, Marshall Piłsudski’s legions, the adorable uhlans, up to contemporary foot-
ball hooligans. All these men communities contribute to Polish national myth. 
However, the homosocial character of these unions is usually marked with a hint 
of homosexual fascination. The latter is denied by ostentatious attachment to 
national heterosexual honour. Also, the Virgin Mary cult has to exclude homo-
sexuality and set up masculine relations as exclusively brotherly ones – all the 
members of a group are brothers, children of the one symbolic mother.  (Janion 
2017: 267)
Today the pressure to exalt such masculine unions seems to be rising everywhere 
and seems to be a central issue for state’s official policy – the recent example is new 
design of Polish passports; it features the image of exclusively masculine independ-
ence heroes. The main page of the new design also includes the motto ‘God, Honour, 
Fatherland’ which was the historical motto of Polish Army and, quite recently, was the 
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motto of ‘the Independence Day Parade’.1 in Warsaw. Scholars (Tomczok 2019: 37−42; 
Gołuński 2019: 43−53) have observed and described an interesting phenomenon of 
“remilitarization” of Polish masculinity in popular culture, other authors (Olechnicki, 
Szlendak, & Karwacki 2016) analyze the popularity of military reconstruction groups 
and festivals in contemporary Poland. Scholars (Tomasik 2013; Janion 2017; Śmieja 
2017)  generally agree that ‘militarized’ masculinity model was dominant in Polish 
culture probably longer than in bourgeois societies of the West. Such ‘military mascu-
linity’ monopolized hegemonic position throughout almost the whole 20th century. 
Prewar Poland celebrated Marshall Piłsudski’s legions and uhlans as those, whose ef-
forts brought and defended the first independence (1918 – 1939), what entitled them 
to rule the country which was often referred to as “timocracy” (Leder 2014: 7; Miłosz 
2008: 456). The cult of Marshall Piłsudski and his successor, Marshall Rydz-Śmigły, 
could be compared to Mussolini’s Italian fascist cult (Wójcik 1987). Postwar commu-
nists used this trust in army and military force to present them not as a means of op-
pression but as hereditary of Millenial statehood traditions, means of social advance-
ment for young men from rural areas, an important element of country’s economy. 
Historians (Zaremba 2001; Dronicz 2002) agree that military service was highly valued 
à l’epoque (young men could easily acquire new skills: driver, mechanic, electronics, 
etc.) and the army was granted with respect and confidence, especially in the 60’s 
and early 70’s, the golden age of ‘military patriotism’ (Polniak 2011). It’s the work-
ers’ rebellion of 1980 and the Martial law introduced in 1981 and cancelled in 1983 
that changed this unquestioned position of military-shaped masculinity and under-
mined the army’s position as the central institution of Polish statehood (Śmieja 2017: 
302−317). Since then, the army and military masculinities have been losing its allure. 
The fall of communism in 1989 brought an opportunity to talk about the army and the 
mechanisms of forming military masculinity more openly and critically. Significantly, 
this period’s blockbuster movies (Samowolka, Kroll)  dealt with bullying, humiliation, 
violence, and inhuman behaviour hidden behind the barracks walls. Their message 
was clear: institutional dehumanization was the unique mean for creating the “mili-
tary men”. With its drill, the army served as a pars pro toto for the communist system 
as a system of oppression and regular violence.
With the fall of communism, the new economic opportunities opened, free market 
and freedom of working abroad made ‘masculinities in uniforms’ less attractive and, 
to some degree, obsolete. Heroes of global popular culture and the ideals of pros-
perous yuppie or ‘middle class’ man proliferated among young people – educational 
boom started, and thousands of young men studied the most popular fields: market-
ing, management, advertising, law (Szcześniak 2017: 40−143). Meanwhile, the new 
policymakers opted for the professionalization of military service instead of conscrip-
tion.
1 Since 2012 each year’s parade has its motto: 2012 (25 000 participants) “Let’s regain Poland!” 2013 
(25 000 – 30 000 participants): “New Generation comes!”, 2014 (50 000 participants): “The Army of Pa-
triots”, 2015 (70 000 – 100 000 participants): “Poland for the Poles, the Poles for Poland”; 2016 (75 000 
– 100 000 participants) motto “Poland–the bastion of Europe”; 2017 (participants 60 000): “We want 
God!”; 2018 (250 000 participants): “God, Honour, Fatherland.”
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[…] after 1989, the distance between the military and society started to grow, cul-
minating in the professionalization of the army and the abolition of conscription 
and a replacement of defence training classes in schools with a less-militarized 
education for security. According to polls conducted by the IPC research insti-
tute for the Ministry of National Defense in 2013, only 9% of young Poles wanted 
to have a career in the military or were seriously considering it, while the per-
centage of those utterly uninterested in the military was the highest among the 
youngest members of the studied group. It seems Poles have ceased to perceive 
the duty to defend the country, featured in article 13 of the Polish Constitution, 
as a necessary and desired element of the social contract. Surveys performed for 
the Rzeczpospolita daily in 2014 showed that only 19% of Poles were willing to 
sacrifice their life or health for the country. (Grzebalska 2017)
At the beginning of Polish transformation, in 1994, Maria Janion noticed an even 
wider erosion process that traditional paradigms of Polish culture underwent. The in-
tergenerational transfers of soldiery values were blocked: 
The youth doesn’t care much – and it is worth more in-depth consideration. 
Probably all these discussions between the combatants and the civilians are 
false? Youth watch with disgust the heroes of bygone wars with all their medals, 
bands and flags. Young people unconsciously feel that they shouldn’t care, that 
it’s not their business. (Janion 1998: 327)
Since then, however, the things have been changing, and more traditional vision 
of history, tradition and gender order is often considered more adequate and desired. 
Some of the initiatives that contributed to this flourishing of memory – like the 
campaign “Let’s rebuild the Home Army” (‘Odbudujmy AK’) which encouraged citi-
zens to participate in the creation of citizens’ territorial defence modelled after the 
central Polish resistance organization (Armia Krajowa, AK) – were practical and mobi-
lizing in character. However, the militarism that stemmed from the Polish flourishing 
of memory was, in no small extent rather historical and nostalgic than active in char-
acter. It was more about building cultural identification with a particular vision of the 
past and legitimizing the national right’s political project than about inciting actual 
military activities here and now (Grzebalska 2017).
Although masculinity is not at stake in recent Tomasz Plata’s book (Plata 2017), the 
author claims that situation has dramatically changed in recent years and persuasively 
argues that traditional paradigms rooted in early 19th-century imagination have been 
reinvigorating after 2010 and, as the 19th century is marked by the loss of statehood 
and independence, patriotism and struggle against external powers are important el-
ements of these retraditionalizations. It is rather apparent that we cannot revive the 
ideology without its (gendered) bearers. The traditionalized vision of masculinity has 
been gaining legitimization through historical imagination, which is a vision of a war-
like, ready-to-fight/die man. Attempts to remilitarize young men and signs of their 
spontaneous retraditionalization are ubiquitously observable phenomena nowadays. 
There are a few areas where we can see these processes. The most interesting and the 
most noticeable, yet not analyzed sufficiently, is the popularity of so-called ‘military 
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classes’ in public high schools. The first 62 classes appeared in 1999 as an effect of the 
Ministry of Defense project.
However, nowadays no one has control over them, and their number continually 
rises – according to the Ministry of Defense data, there are almost 600 schools with 
military classes nowadays. Such education is widespread in less developed, rural and 
suburban areas and among working-class environments. Young people,  mostly boys, 
believe that graduating them will allow them to start a professional career,  become 
professional soldiers, policeman, etc. Their motivation is, as the survey says (Urych 
2017: 148−177), at least practical and partly economic – stable professional position 
and guaranteed income are their general expectation. Such a career model is consid-
ered as social advancement and warrant of stable income. However, the truth is that 
neither army nor police favour military-classes alumni, who outnumber the real needs 
of the army or the police. Why, then, schools decide to offer, at least partly, baseless 
promises to young people? Such classes are trendy (3 to 4 candidates in 1 place) and by 
organizing ‘military classes’ schools counteract the demographic decline and the loss 
of working positions for teachers (Łydka 2013). The journalist Ewa Turlej, who spe-
cializes in education, alarms that paramilitary−nationalist organizations often infil-
trate military classes. There are no specific data, but in one of Warsaw’s high schools, 
the whole class enlisted to ‘the Shooter’ paramilitary group. The organization offers 
practical training in police or military actions. However, it simultaneously filters ide-
ological message that underground defence forces should be formed and its members 
should be ready to fight either external or internal enemy (Turlej 2014).
Except pre−military training school curricula abound in particular patriotic activi-
ties and the officially approved cult of so-called ‘accursed soldiers’ (Smuniewski 2016: 
39−54). Many students graduating military class without the possibility to start a ca-
reer in army/police etc. is a shocking moment of truth.  Instead of prestigious service, 
they are offered low-paid jobs in services or leave home to find a job elsewhere. For 
many of them, it is the moment, when they could feel for the first time the emotion 
wittingly named ‘aggrieved entitlement’: they felt they are entitled to serve Father-
land, but Fatherland can do without them easily and doesn’t favor their school efforts 
and commitment. 
 Another essential factor of military ‘remasculinization’ is the politics of memory 
which is the milestone for Polish right-wingers’ identity ideology. Since 2004 the is-
sue of politics of memory is at the core of Poland’s public discussions (Napiórkowski 
2016: 361). Among the vast array of institutions and activities, I would like to focus 
on one institution whose influence on contemporary politics of memory is exemplary 
and served as a model for many other sources, institutions and activities. The Museum 
of Warsaw Uprising opened in 2004. It was created thanks to Warsaw’s and Poland’s 
former president, Lech Kaczynski, and since the beginning, it is marked by his political 
bias. The Uprising itself has numerous interpretations and it still provokes emotional 
reactions, so commemorating it should be, as I believe, very cautious, nuanced and 
balanced, yet we are offered only one vision of the Uprising celebrated in the Museum. 
The heroic one. This vision celebrates in the first place the military history, and those, 
who fought in the Uprising, and, at least to some degree presents the suffering of the 
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civilians not as an effect of political miscalculations, but as a proof of Nazi bestiality. 
According to a research (Napiórkowski 2016: 380)–many of the visitors leave the mu-
seum with a false conviction that the uprising was the victory, not the massacre and the 
annihilation of the capital with its inhabitants; the uprisers are presented as young, 
attractive, courageous, selfless, sacrificial and heroic ideals for contemporary youth. 
The Museum proved its effectiveness as the creator of the contemporary politics of 
memory. It initiated numerous popular films (Powstanie ‘44), TV series (Czas Honoru), 
music albums (Lao Che, ‘Powstanie Warszawskie’) and aesthetisation/gadgetization 
of memory (popular T-shirts, mural decorations and even blocks for children)–‘reme-
bering’ became fashionable and attractive element of contemporary popular culture. 
*****
ONR (National Radical Camp) is a far-right organization claiming itself to be an ide-
ological descendant of the anti-semitic political movement that existed before World 
War II (ONR shares the same name and symbols as pre-war political group).  ONR at-
tracted publicity in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009 for unauthorized marches during the 
anniversary of the anti−Jewish riots in Myślenice in 1936. In 2005 the group had a 
couple of hundred members.  Since then, the organization has risen considerably. To-
day, it is a leading member of the March of Independence Association, a co−initiative 
of several different nationalist movements. Since 2010 the Association organizes na-
tionalist parades on November 11 in Warsaw to celebrate Independence. On Novem-
ber 11 2017, 60,000 people marched in the Independence Day celebration co-organ-
ized by ONR among others, in 2018 the number reached 250 000. What is less known, 
ONR is also organizing marches and processions on the anniversary of the Warsaw 
Uprising. When anti-democratic organization of far right claims to be the hereditary 
of the Home Army it is, according to some experts (Olaszek 2017) parasitization of the 
memory. According to some experts (Olaszek 2017), the ONR parasitized the memory.
The unofficial form of remembering was gaining popularity and devouring more 
official and less politically involved ways of remembering to the degree that today it 
almost monopolizes National Day celebration in the Polish capital.  The most excit-
ing interpretation of this fact has been proposed by a historian and semiotics scholar, 
Marcin Napiórkowski (2016), who analyzed the Uprising’s forms of commemoration 
and its political implications. He observed that under communism, the Uprising’s re-
membering was forbidden or at least considerably limited in scope. The event itself 
was presented as futile; people were taught that the Red Army progress, not the Upris-
ing, incarnated the sense of history – the sense that could not have been contradicted. 
Contrastively, the political and economic transformation with its neoliberal mantra 
dominated the 90’s and the first decade of the 21st century. It was also presented as 
the incarnation of ubiquitous progress and inevitable historical logic coming to Po-
land from abroad. With famous TINA (there is no alternative) claim to be an universal 
economic and cultural model. However, in the second decade of the 21 century, the 
ubiquitness and the impact of the belief in the neoliberal economy and liberal democ-
racy as the embodiment of Fukuyama’s end of history considerably weakened. They 
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both have lost part of its charm; the economic aims turned out to be challenging to 
reach. The democratic procedures appeared as alienating and ineffective in solving 
social or economic problems. When the logic of the victorious march of progress fails, 
the triumphant march stops and gives way to an emotional funeral procession and – 
according to Napiórkowski – the appropriation of the Uprising memory by those, who 
do not fit to the narratives of progress or, less metaphorically, those whose economic, 
social or cultural resources made them vulnerable to move downward social ladder 
(the only well-organized voice of the resistance against neoliberal economy was the 
voice of football hooligans − Antonowicz, Szlendak, & Kossakowski 2015). Such peo-
ple turn to the past, not into the future; they search for the sense of being in the his-
tory or rather mythical vision of history not in everyday reality, nor unsure future. The 
admiration for the heroic commitment of the uprisers is seen as a miraculous panacea 
for dehumanized global capitalism and intangible sense of beaurocratic institutions. 
Napiórkowski didn’t mention ‘aggrieved entitlement’ (Kimmel 2013) of men, but we 
must add masculinity to his equation as young men dominate the nationalists’ pa-
rades. The ONR members are often recruited among football hooligans, who did not 
accept the neoliberal capitalism and liberal democracy. As the official ideology of the 
ONR is at odds with the ideals of the Home Army and Warsaw Uprising it has to be said 
that the ONR members exalt a particular form of belligerent masculinity they believe 
the uprisers embodied (and the liberal democracy together with neoliberal economy 
denied or made useless). According to the research (Malinowska, Winiewski, & Górska 
2016) the participants of the March of the Independence share the similar social pro-
file as the boys and girls from military classes – they come from small towns in pro-
vincial Poland, (85%), they’re young, they’re mostly men (but the March attracts many 
women and families either). They use some historical symbols to gain political legit-
imization and expression for their anger, their ‘aggrieved entitlement’ (both fascist, 
like the Celtic cross or Roman salute, and traditionally patriotic as ‘Polska Walcząca’ 
sign or emblems of ‘the accursed soldiers’).     
The research on the march participants’ convictions and preferences was carried 
out by the Center for the Research on Prejudices in 2015. The researchers managed 
to ask 296 participants to answer the questionnaires. Three-thirds were men, half of 
them between 21 – 30 years old and almost 30 per cent between 15 and 20, 6 per cent 
younger. Twenty-one per cent declared living in the countryside or rural area, but 
only 15 per cent lived in cities bigger than half a million. Eighty-five per cent of par-
ticipants arrived at the march from outside Warsaw.  The political views – 75 per cent 
declared ‘conservatists’ (32 per cent declared themselves as ‘definitely conservatives’) 
only 13 per cent liberals. However, 75 per cent believed in a free market economy, 
while only about 10 per cent accepted the ideals of the social welfare state. Almost 70 
per cent accepted the view that Poland’s economic situation is worse than in non-de-
fined other countries.
Nevertheless, at the same time, they scarcely consider their economic situation as 
worse when compared with fellow citizens. That is probably why they accept ‘patriot-
ic’ vision and deep conviction that they act in the name of the whole nation. What is 
impressive – a considerable number of interviewees accepted illegal action. Forty per 
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cent declared their readiness to participate in illegal demonstrations and marches, 
35 per cent were ready to occupy governmental buildings, and 18 per cent accepted 
vandalizing public property. The researchers also asked the participants to answer 
right-wing authoritarianism questions (6 questions, RWA-scale; Altemeyer 1988). 
They have also been answering the Social Dominance test (5 questions, SDO; Sidanius 
& Pratto 1994). The results obtained proved that the participants had the higher level 
of AVO than their peers, SDO was also considerably higher: the march participants 
respect group authorities, strong leadership, tradition, their worldview is hierarchical, 
the world is seen as a place where stronger dominate over weak, inequality is natural 
and desired. 
After interviewing the participants, scholars concluded shortly: ‘It seems that this 
hierarchical attitude, not authoritarianism itself, is a distinctive feature of the march 
participants’ (Malinowska, Winiewski, & Górska 2016: 13). When one is convinced 
that the world is a jungle where only the fittest survive, it is natural that they want 
to be healthy and play a central role in it. The Polish radical movement consequently 
struggles to gain a dominant position in the social and political scene. The occupation 
of central and symbolic places of the capital on November 11 and monopolization of 
patriotic, national symbols which mingle smoothly with fascist emblems and football 
clubs logos in the march visual aspect fulfils young men’s sense of power, mission 
and brotherhood. Simultaneously they leave little or no place for other ways of cele-
brating and understanding Independence, patriotism, attachment to the republican 
values (Olaszek 2017).
Young Polish sociologist Bogna Kociołowicz (2017: 65−76) has analyzed ‘the In-
dependence March’ member-organizations discourse (official statements, websites, 
discussion groups, FB profiles) to reveal the vision of masculinity they embody.  She 
described the ideal type of Polish Man as courageous and ready to defend the Father-
land and women, controlling women’s fertility as it guarantees the survival of the 
nation, homophobic and contemplating gayness (or gayness visual attributes) as use-
less in the highest vocation of a man: defence of the country. Such men are ‘true men’ 
in contrast with their ‘European’ counterparts, presented in propaganda materials as 
emasculated by gender education and ‘tolerantism’ wimp – the symbol and the reason 
for the decline of the West in Polish nationalists’ eyes. Last but not east, such tradi-
tional Man is attached to the Catholicism and embodies the tradition of ‘antemurale 
Christianitatis’ (Christianity is attacked from the Western secularism and the Eastern 
Islamism). To successfully defend women and Fatherland, men should work on their 
physical strength and sustain the cult of heroes embodying such virtues as courage and 
sacrifice for the sake of the country and the nation. Popular t-shirts, Internet graphics, 
mural graffities, invade public space popularizing slogans as “Army of patriots”, “Po-
land–first to fight!”, “Death to the enemies of our fatherland!” Prevalent representa-
tion and identification unite contemporary radicals with the so-called ‘accursed sol-
diers.’ The Young radicals identify themselves as the inheritors of them. What can 
we learn about Polish angry Young men from that fact? The ‘cursed soldiers’ (Żołni-
erze wyklęci) is a term applied to various Polish anti-Soviet or anti-communist re-
sistance movements formed in the later stages of World War II and its aftermath by 
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some members of the Polish Underground State. The clandestine organizations con-
tinued their armed struggle against the communist government of Poland well into 
the 1950s. The guerrilla warfare included an array of military attacks launched against 
the communist regime’s prisons and state security offices, detention facilities for po-
litical prisoners and concentration camps set up across the country. No one denies the 
guerrillas’ existence, but they did not call themselves ‘accursed soldiers’ (the term was 
invented in mid-90’ by historians) and their fight, as described by historians, is highly 
controversial. First of all – they fought against the High Command in London orders 
which decided to stop any military action after January 1945. Secondly, a significant 
part of them were the groups of demoralized ‘dogs of war’ without any sublime ideolo-
gy or sense of a mission, as documented by historian Marcin Zaremba (Zaremba 2012). 
Thirdly, the accursed soldiers committed numerous attacks, massacres and war crimes 
on civilians, Jews, Ukrainian and Belorussian minorities.  Today the cursed soldiers, 
yet controversial, are officially celebrated on March 1 (National Day of the Cursed 
Soldiers), their struggle is popularized in schoolbooks and popular culture (Łabusze-
wski et al. 2016). Besides this official politics of memory, the accursed soldiers are the 
patrons of radical groups: these groups cherish their radicalism and the spirit of inde-
pendence from external powers and commands, what is highlighted is the desperado 
character and the hopelessness of their struggle against the overwhelming powers of 
treacherous West and Soviet East. In contrast to the Home Army and Warsaw uprisers, 
whose social background is considered slightly elitarist, ‘the accursed soldiers’ are be-
lieved to incarnate the people’s will. And their social profile, more egalitarian, is con-
sidered to be closer to the profile of the radical right-wing movements as ONR. It was 
the Yalta treaty of 1945 that forced them to fight. Their situation is often compared 
to Poland’s contemporary ‘EU-occupation’, which nationalist have to confront as it is 
seen as aiming at annihilation of Poland emasculating Polish men. The discourse of 
radical right confronts with women’s mobilization (Black Prostests, Women’s Strike) 
against implementation of anti−abortion law. ‘Black protests’ gathered hundreds of 
thousands of people, mostly women, to resist. The far-right groups stand against ‘fem-
inists, lesbians and gays.’ Far-right organizations actively supported conservative part 
of Polish society and the Polish Church in their struggle to enforce this law. On this 
basis, the radical movements present themselves as the protectors of ‘traditional val-
ues’, ‘Christendom’ and the Nation against morally corrupted West with its gender and 
sex education, the liberation of women and respect for minorities. Nationalists’ web-
sites, marches, FB profiles abound in slogans like Here’s Poland, not Brussels; here we 
do not support perversions. Both liberal women and LGBT people are considered as the 
internal enemy. The participants of the March of the Independece set fire into Julita 
Wójcik’s artistic ‘Rainbow’ installation. The eradication of LGBT symbol out of city-
scape is seen as a major symbolic victory of the radical movements. The homophobic 
fury of the ONR is so frenzied that sometimes it simply becomes funny and subverts 
the strength of homosocial bonding. In 2013 the ONR demonstrated against LGBT pa-
rade in Warsaw – one of the slogans became famous and is often satirized and laughed 
at: We want men, not fags motto with horrible spelling mistake in a word ‘mężczyzn’; 
(i.e. ‘men’) reveals surprisingly queer meaning and denounces miserable cultural cap-
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ital of the banner-holders. 
What is really desired are not the only men but also God as a metaphysical warrant 
of ‘traditional values’. Each of the Independence Parades co-organized by the ONR has 
its leading slogan. In 2017 it was We want God, the 2018th year’s march’s motto was 
God, Honour, Fatherland  (the same as in newly designed passports then). The slogan 
is deeply rooted in Polish history and for many years it was the lemma for the armed 
forces fighting with, considered as godless Nazis, and the Soviets. Indeed, religion, the 
Roman Catholicism, plays a crucial role in the concept of Polish far-right masculinity. 
Jasna Góra (Clara Montana) is a Catholic monastery with symbolic meaning in Poland 
(in 1656 the Poles successfully defended the cloister against the Swedish protestant 
siege and it was believed that the Holy Mary intervened miraculously to save its peo-
ple). The monastery kept functioning during Poland’s partition, during the German 
occupation and under communism – it is a symbol of the national idea’s continuity 
and strength. Each summer, hundreds of thousands of people from around the country 
pilgrim to participate in religious celebrations and listen to the bishops’ statements 
on current issues that traditionally accompany religious meetings. However, for seven 
years, the ONR has organized its pilgrimage to get the benediction from favourable 
bishops and priests. It is a true spectacle, where patriotic and religious traditions in-
terfere with purely fascist iconography and requisites. The Catholic creed is an im-
portant ideological glue for ONR masculinist ideology. ONR manifesto accentuates it 
clearly2.
*****
The ‘retrotopic’ (Bauman 2017) model of masculinity, as it is celebrated by the radical 
groups and performed during their parades, is neither a simple repetition nor the full-
scale reconstruction. It has to be said that the historical props and images function in 
radically different economic, social and, what is even more important, technological 
environment. The adequate description of this ‘multiple’ (Hardt & Negri 2004: 287) 
body of ‘spectacular masculinity’ is provided by Steve Garlick (Garlick 2016: 163−193). 
The Canadian philosopher described the emergence of ‘spectacular masculinity’ dur-
ing 2011 worldwide riots (Arab Spring, Vancouver riots, protests in England after po-
lice shooting in London). He concentrated on the Vancouver riots of 2011 as they are 
easily compared with a similar event in 1994. The most crucial difference between the 
events was the use of social media: ‘During the 1994 riot they had 100 hours of VHS 
tape, now with every teen holding a different kind of cell phone camera, they were 
dealing with 5000 hours of 100 types of digital video.’3 Compared to the 1994 Vancou-
ver riot, Garlick comments, arguably the most distinctive feature of the 2011 version 
was the extent to which it was staged as spectacle’.  The attraction of the young men 
involved in the violence and destruction seemed almost as though they were per-
formed for the sake of the cell phones that constituted their audience.” (Garlick 2016: 
2 Deklararcja ideowa ONR. Retrieved November 2, 2021 (https://www.onr.com.pl/deklaracja−ideowa/). 




To understand what is happening during such riots as in Vancouver or in Warsaw, 
we have to develop new modes of explanations:
Vancouver riot was an incident in which sport, technology and violence mixed in 
a complex interplay of factors that fostered the emergence of a spectacular mode 
of hegemonic masculinity. This does not mean that rioting or violence can be re-
duced to the influence of hockey culture, technology, or gender. On the contrary 
[…] these factors possess significant explanatory power only if incorporated into 
a complexity perspective that foregrounds the nonlinear circulation of affects 
tan allows for emergent realities. (Garlick 2016: 165)
The 2011 Independence March in Warsaw initiated wide-scale rioting and looting 
− the TVN television car was burned then. The next year the riots, violence and loot-
ing were much more intensive and broader in scope − after the battle with the police 
176 people were arrested. The symbolic burning marks the 2013 parade down ‘the 
Rainbow’ (the artistic installation on one of central Warsaw’s squares presumed to 
symbolize ‘gayness’, pedalstwo), burning down the kiosk in front of Russian Federa-
tion Embassy, attempts to destroy squat building ‘Przychodnia’. All these ‘spectacular’ 
events were reported or streamed immediately by the participants. Garlick suggests 
that social media are crucial participants in the riot, and photography, event if banal 
as technology nowadays, shouldn’t be underestimated, as it ‘includes the ability to 
stabilize identity in the face of an uncertain world, which has always been central to 
the appeal and promise of photography’ (Garlick 2016: 173). The circulation of photos 
is employed ‘toward the end of stabilizing the situation and […], producing emergent 
masculinities that endured beyond the instant to claim some form of recognition and 
ontological security.’ (p. 175) 
Polish radical movements intermingle with football hooligans organizations, so we 
should not be surprised that the expressions of ‘spectacular masculinity’ adapt forms 
and props from football stadium tribunes (club emblems, balaclavas, flares, however, 
banned, are an iconic element of the marches). Similarly, like in Vancouver, the War-
saw riot “was an incident […] that fostered the emergence of a spectacular mode of 
hegemonic masculinity” (Garlick 2016: 165) – what was marginal and despised, for 
example, suburban football culture, became central and frightful. In the local Polish 
context, it is worth noticing that the liberal government started acting against foot-
ball fans in 2007. The action reached a peak in 2011−2012 (UEFA Euro 2012 Cup was 
organized in Poland and Ukraine) − new football infrastructure pushed radical football 
fans out of the stadiums, which are no longer ‘territories for the expression of social 
discontent and arenas for articulating frustration and tensions located in social and 
economic processes of transition’, the stadiums were ‘the oasis for social and cultural 
activities of those who are excluded from modernization’ (Antonowicz, Szlendak, & 
Kossakowski 2016: 218). The key-role technology in shaping this form of expression of 
masculinity is, according to Garlick, photography circulating in social networks which 
turns riots into a direct media spectacle. Warsaw riot produced a ‘spectacular mascu-
linity’ that, ‘via the digitized photographic image, secured its repetition in time but at 
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the expense of reifying its nature’ (Garlick 2016: 178). Garlick claims that Vancouver 
riots (the event took place in the vicinity of the tv station building) that “participants 
appeared to desire just such a spectacle as they sought attention from the cameras and 
the assembled crowd” (Garlick 2016: 185).
Similarly, the tv crew car was burnt down the same year in Warsaw − and what 
could be more attractive to the media than attacking the media? According to Garlick, 
a photographic form of commemoration is a technology of nature, quite similar in its 
essence to gender (Garlick 2016: 176) as a technology of mastering nature. Spectacular 
media-narcissistic gender performances we witness during the Independece Marches 
have in their retrotopic attitude decidedly postmodern character:
Today, however, in the fluid and uncertain world of liquid modernity (Bauman 
2000), the assumed guarantees of rational, techno-scientific control over the 
world appear no doubt for many men. The riot is both a symptom of this condi-
tion and a vehicle for restoring masculine power and ontological security. If he-
gemonic masculinities prescribe a position of power and authority over one’s en-
vironment, today this imperative increasingly means attempts by young men to 
establish control over the city. From this perspective, young men burning police 
cars and looting or trashing department stores amounts to an implicit challenge 
to the control of the state and capital over the urban environment. […] More than 
anything, the riot was a spectacle of masculinity. (Garlick 2016: 187)
The Canadian scholar concludes that these anti-capitalist and anti-modern modes 
of expression of masculinity are side effects of the modern economy. However, their 
violent revolt has not got revolutionary potential:
Men’s violence expresses the desire for more control and greater ontological 
security than on offer in contemporary gendered, capitalist societies. Howev-
er, instead of fostering relationality, creativity and the expansion of life, such 
violence is directed toward a negation of complexity and restriction of ‘erotic’ 
energy within the boundaries of gender, while deflecting attention away from 
the political and economic institutions that limit collective freedoms. On the 
other hand, participation in the riot, like Adorno’s (1997) notion of “shudder” 
has an aesthetic dimension that momentarily re-enliven bodies suffering from 
the diminishment of their capacities under the standardization of gender and 
economic regimes (among others). (2016: 193–194)
 To conclude briefly, the Independence March is a spectacular mode of hegemonic 
masculinity, or, to be more precise, of masculinity aspiring to hegemony through a 
wide array of means: historical claims and subcultural appropriations, violent demon-
strations on the streets and the use of modern technology, which gives young men and 
participants a sort of positive and reinforcing feedback.
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